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et al.: Right to Counsel

RIGHT TO COUNSEL
N.Y CONST. art. I, § 6:

In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appearand defend in person and with counsel as in
civil actions ....
U.S. CONsT. amend VI:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ...to have Assistance of Counselfor his defence.

COURT OF APPEALS
18 14
People v. Rosen
(decided May 6, 1993)

Defendant claimed that his right to proceed pro se under the
New York State Constitution1 8 15 was violated when the trial

judge refused, without explanation, to allow him to attend sidebar
conferences, despite specific requests. 18 16 The New York Court
of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction and ordered a new

trial, holding that defendant's right to self-representation had
been violated by the arbitrary and categorical exclusion from
18 17
sidebar conferences.
The record indicated that the defendant was indicted for a
variety of charges, including "conspiracy, grand larceny and

other felonies arising out of a complex scheme to defraud
investors . . ."1818 The defendant's assigned counsel had sought
1814. 81 N.Y.2d 237, 613 N.E.2d 946, 597 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1993).
1815. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any
trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and
defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses
against him." Id.
1816. Rosen, 81 N.Y.2d at 242, 613 N.E.2d at 947, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
1817. Id. at 246, 613 N.E.2d at 949, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
1818. Id. at 241, 613 N.E.2d at 947, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
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a mistrial after the prosecution's first witness had been
questioned by the court. 18 19 The assigned counsel claimed that
questions posed by the trial judge assisted the prosecution. 1820 In
support of his motion for a mistrial, counsel argued that the court
could not provide a fair trial, since it had "expressed an opinion
regarding the defendant's guilt in an off-the-record
discussion." 182 1 Upon denial of this motion the court added,
"[f]or that matter you told me you thought Mr. Rosen was guilty
in our off the record conversation." 18 2 2 The court also explained
that it found it necessary to intercede because the defense counsel
did not pose its questions correctly. 1823 Subsequently, the
defendant's counsel made a motion for mistrial, stating that his
client had lost confidence in his ability. Again, the motion was
denied. 1824 Following the testimony of several additional
witnesses for the people, the "defendant informed the court that
he wished to represent himself for the remainder of the

trial . .

"1825 After hearing the court's admonition concerning

the dangers inherent in self-representation,

1826

and conferring

1819. Id.
1820. Id.
1821. Id.
1822. Id.
1823. Id.
1824. Id.
1825. Id. The defendant informed the court that, as a result of "numerous
factual mistakes and inadequate cross-examination" by his counsel, he wished
to represent himself. Id.; see also People v. Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383, 390,
494 N.E.2d 77, 81, 502 N.Y.S.2d 972, 976 (1986) (reasoning that defendant
who retains a lawyer gives up control of much of the case except for "certain
fundamental decisions reserved to the client").
1826. Rosen, 81 N.Y.2d at 211, 613 N.E.2d at 947, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 915;
see generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). In Powell the
Court stated that:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
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with his counsel, the defendant insisted on proceeding as his own
lawyer. 1827 Consequently, the court granted the defendant's
request to proceed pro se and to have assigned counsel remain as
1828
"legal advisor."
The defendant's constitutional claim was based upon the
absolute restriction by the trial judge that "the defendant would
not be allowed to attend any sidebar conferences." Although
defendant had taken control of his own defense and had
specifically requested that he be allowed to be present at sidebar
conferences, the trial court refused to allow his attendance. 182 9

The trial court stated that "sidebar conferences did not include
the defendant. Some [of the conferences] involved purely
'housekeeping' matters, others substantive issues, others were off
the record. Some were held in the jury's presence, others not;

the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he may have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how
to establish his innocence.
Id.
1827. Rosen, 81 N.Y.2d at 241, 613 N.E.2d at 947, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
1828. Id. at 241-42, 613 N.E.2d at 947, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
1829. Id. at 242, 613 N.E.2d at 947, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
"[Counsel]: Yes, there is a matter that needs to be cleared up at this
time. If Mr. Rosen plans on questioning as he does and if there is a
sidebar, or if there is a sidebar which has occurred prior to his time,
Mr. Rosen requests that he be allowed to attend the sidebar.
"The Court: I won't be having sidebars with Mr. Rosen. If it is
necessary I will excuse the jury. There will be no sidebars with Mr.
Rosen."
Id. The prosecution in Rosen argued that "standby counsel's appearances at
conferences reflected the 'division of labor' chosen by defendant, and that the
trial court could not have known that defendant wished to participate." Id. at
245, 613 N.E.2d at 949, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 917. "[In light of the] record the
[court] conclu[ded] ... that the division of labor, at least in connection with
sidebar conferences, was imposed, not chosen." Id. The people further
contended that defendant's claim was not preserved. They faulted the
defendant for not pursuing further his request to attend sidebars. Id. The court
found, the "defendant's specific application and the court's equally specific
ruling were sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal." Id.
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1830
some were initiated by the court, others by standby counsel."
It was this arbitrary denial of any opportunity to attend sidebar
conferences which violated the defendant's state constitutional
right to self-representation. 183 1

In its decision, the court of appeals acknowledged that "[tihe
right to appear pro se exists, in part, 'to affirm the dignity and
autonomy of the accused.'" 18 3 2 This court stated, "indisputably,
a defense representative, acting as counsel, was entitled to attend
18 33
sidebars."

1830. Id. at 242, 613 N.E.2d at 947, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
1831. Id. at 241, 613 N.E.2d at 947, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 915. The defendant
complained that
off-the-record conferences were unfair because reports of the
conferences were secondhand and 'diluted.' Defendant cited as an
example a 12 to 15 minute sidebar that was summarized for him in two
minutes .... [The] defendant recited his understanding of the court's

previous ruling whereby defendant would 'not [be] attending bench
conferences, and if necessary... you would have the jury leave; or if
the jury wasn't here you would instead of having a bench conference,
you would have it in open court and on the record' ....
Id. at 242, 613 N.E.2d at 947, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 915-16; see also McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1983). In McKaskle, the United States
Supreme Court found that "[s]ince the right of self representation is a right that
when exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable
to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to 'harmless error' analysis. The
right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless." Id.
1832. Id. at 245, 613 N.E.2d at 949, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (quoting
McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 176-77); see People v. McIntyre 36 N.Y.2d 10, 17,
324 N.E.2d 322, 327, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 844. The court delineated provisions
to be met in order to invoke the right to defend pro se: "(1) the request is
unequivocal and timely asserted, (2) there has been a knowing and intelligent
waiver of the right to counsel, and (3) the defendant had not engaged in
conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues."
Id.; see also Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965) ("[E]ven in
cases where the accused is harming himself by insisting on conducting his own
defense, respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to
jail under his own banner if he so desires and if he makes the choice 'with eyes
open.'").
1833. Rosen, 81 N.Y.2d at 245, 613 N.E.2d at 949, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 917.
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If a court, in its discretion, appoints standby counsel, 18 34 such
counsel must generally respect the preferences of the
defendant. 18 3 5 Such deference is based upon the objective of
preserving the pro se defendant's control over his case and the
perspective of the jury with regard to such control. 18 3 6 However,
counsel does not have to be excluded altogether, "especially
when the participation is outside the presence of the jury or is
with the defendant's express or tacit consent."1837 The Supreme
Court, in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 1 8 3 8 reasoned that the
participation of standby counsel without the defendant's consent
poses a risk of "destroying the jury's perception that the
defendant is representing himself."1839
Prior to this case, the New York courts had not resolved this
precise issue. This is evidenced by the appellate court's decision
which, while affirming the trial court's conviction, noted "the
issue was not free from doubt." 1840 The right to proceed pro se
1834. See People v. Mirenda, 57 N.Y.2d 261, 264, 442 N.E.2d 49, 50, 455
N.Y.S.2d 752, 753 (1982). The court of appeals held that "[a] criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to be represented by counsel, or to proceed
pro se. A defendant has no constitutional right, however, to the assistance of a
lawyer while conducting aprose defense." Id.
1835. See People v. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 22, 438 N.E.2d 1133, 1139,
453 N.Y.S.2d 418, 424 (1982) (recognizing that a judge may appoint standby
counsel even over defendant's objection), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178 (1983);
see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46 (1975) ("[A] State may
- even over objection by the accused - appoint a 'standby counsel' to aid the
accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent
the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation
isnecessary.").
1836. Rosen, 81 N.Y.2d at 244, 613 N.E.2d at 949, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 917
(quoting McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 174). In McKaskle, the Supreme Court stated,
"the pro se defendant must be allowed to control the organization and content
of his defense, to make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir
dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropriate
points in the trial." McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 174.
1837. McKaslde, 465 U.S. at 188.
1838. 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
1839. Id. at 178. The court stated that "the message conveyed by the defense
may depend as much on the messenger as on the message itself." Id. at 179.
1840. People v. Rosen, 185 A.D.2d 128, 130, 585 N.Y.S.2d 742, 744 (1st
Dep't 1992).
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is clearly recognized in the New York State Constitution. 184 1
Yet, the right to proceed pro se is subject to restrictions which

promote the "orderly administration of justice." 1842
In Rosen, the New York Court of Appeals found that the trial
court's

arbitrary

barring

of the

defendant

from

sidebar

conferences despite his specific request was inconsistent with the
state constitutional provision securing the right to "appear and
defend in person."

184 3

However, the court recognized that the

right to attend sidebars is no broader than the right to selfrepresentation itself. It may, within an appropriate exercise of
discretion, be denied or divested. 1844 In deciding, the court
determined that the trial court advanced no reason for its refusal
to permit the defendant to attend sidebars, 1845 and therefore,

acted "arbitrarily"

and "categorically,"

thus violating the

protected state constitutional rights of the defendant.
The Supreme Court, in Faretta v. California,1846 recognized

the right of a defendant to conduct his own defense under the
Sixth Amendment. 1847 In McKaskle v. Wiggins, 184 8 the court
resolved the issue of what role standby counsel, who is present at

trial over defendant's objection, may play, so as not to be
inconsistent with the defendant's Farettarights. 1849 In McKaskle,
1841. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
1842. See also People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 17, 325 N.E.2d 322,
327, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 844 (1974).
1843. Rosen, 81 N.Y.2d at 244, 613 N.E.2d at 948, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
1844. Id. at 246, 613 N.E.2d at 949-50, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 917-18.
1845. See United States v. Mills 895 F.2d 897, 899 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 951 (1990). In Mills, the defendant's complaint on appeal argued that
he should have been able to attend sidebar conferences and make legal
arguments. Id. Although the complaint was valid, the court examined the
entire record and did not find a basis for reversal. Id. In addition, the record
did not reveal any indication that the defendant objected to being excluded. Id.
1846. 422 U.S. 806 (1974).
1847. Id. at 819. The FarettaCourt stated that "[t]he Sixth Amendment does
not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to
the accused personally the right to make his defense." Id.
1848. 465 U.S. 168 (1983).
1849. Id. at 177. The Court found that to be consistent with the Farettaright
to proceed pro se, there must be limits on the extent of standby counsel's
unsolicited participation. Id.
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the issue concerned whether the defendant's rights were violated
by the overzealous standby counsel. 1850 The Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals judgment, which completely limited

the role of standby counsel when defendant had objected, and
instead held counsel may not substantially interfere with any
significant tactical decisions, or control the questioning of
witnesses or speak instead of the defendant on any matter of
importance. 1851
Therefore, under the New York State Constitution and the
Federal Constitution, a pro se defendant, who is actively
asserting his right to self-representation, cannot be arbitrarily and
sidebar
participating
in
barred
from
categorically
85
conferences. 1 7

18 5 3
People v. Ruff
(decided June 8, 1993)

Petitioner, convicted of murder in the first degree, claimed that
his right to counsel under both the New

York1 8 5 4

and

1850. Id. at 176.
1851. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 184. The Court made explicit what was already
implied in Faretta:
A defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not violated when a trial
judge appoints standby counsel - even over the defendant's objection to relieve the judge of the need to explain and enforce basic rules of
courtroom protocol or to assist the defendant in overcoming routine
obstacles that stand in the way of the defendant's achievement of his
own clearly indicated goals. Participation by counsel to steer a
defendant through basic procedures of trial is permissible even in the
unlikely event that it somewhat undermines the pro se defendant's
appearance of control over his own defense.
Id.
1852. Rosen, 81 N.Y.2d at 245, 613 N.E.2d 946, 597 N.Y.S.2d 914; see
also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818-19 (finding that Sixth Amendment guarantees a
criminal defendant the corollary right to dispense with counsel and to present
his defense in the manner of his choosing).
1853. 81 N.Y.2d 330, 615 N.E.2d 611, 599 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1993).
1854. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any trial in any
court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in
person and with counsel ...

.

." Id.
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